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Abstract—It is well-known that autonomous underwater vehi-
cle (AUV) missions are a challenging, high-risk robotics applica-
tion. With many parallels to Mars rovers, AUV missions involve
operating a vehicle in an inherently uncertain environment of
which our prior knowledge is often sparse or low-resolution. The
lack of an accurate prior, coupled with poor situational awareness
and potentially significant sensor noise, presents substantial
engineering challenges in navigation, localisation, state estimation
and control. When constructing missions and operating AUVs,
it is important to consider the risks involved. Stakeholders need
to be reassured that risks of vehicle loss or damage have been
minimised where possible, and scientists need to be confident
that the mission is likely to produce sufficient high-quality
data to meet the aims of the deployment. In this paper, we
consider the challenges associated with risk analysis methods and
representations for multi-vehicle missions, reviewing the relevant
literature and proposing a methodology.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) mis-
sions have consisted of a simple sequence of instructions,
such as travelling between multiple waypoints, pre-defined
by an operator to be within safe-working constraints [1], e.g.
ensuring the vehicle maintains a safe distance from the sea
floor. Consequently, previous applications of risk and reliabil-
ity techniques to AUV operations has primarily focussed on
attempting to quantify the general reliability of the physical
vehicle and its component sub-systems, e.g. the propulsion or
manoeuvring systems, through the use of mean-time between
failures, fault-trees [2], [3] and expert elicitation [4].
In this paper, we present a review of existing risk and reli-
ability techniques, both within the marine autonomy literature
and other related fields. The suitability of each approach is
evaluated in the context of our multi-vehicle application and
we discuss our proposed risk and reliability methodology.
II. MOTIVATING PROBLEM: MULTI-VEHICLE MARINE
DOMAINS
Multi-vehicle mission formats are becoming increasingly
popular for a variety of applications [5], [6]. Multiple AUVs
can survey larger areas, whilst autonomous surface vessels
(ASVs) may act as communication hubs or provide naviga-
tional updates for AUVs. Whilst some of the traditional chal-
lenges associated with AUV operations may be reduced by the
Fig. 1. C-Enduro [7] (Photo: Autonomous Surface Vehicles Ltd.)
Fig. 2. Autosub Long-Range [8]
presence of a second vehicle, this multi-vehicle marine domain
brings new behaviour requirements and thus risks, which need
to be further analysed and mitigated where possible.
As part of an Innovate UK funded project (Autonomous
Surface / Sub-surface Survey System - ASSS) [9] with industry
partners1, we are researching the use of the C-Enduro [7] ASV
(see Figure 1) as a navigation aid and communication link to
the long-endurance AUV Autosub Long-Range (ALR) [8] (see
Figure 2). As a long-endurance platform, ALR sacrifices power
available to sensors to maximise vehicle range. Consequently,
1Autonomous Surface Vehicles Ltd, Sonardyne International Ltd and See-
Byte Ltd.
Fig. 3. Schematic showing the various operating modes considered within the ASSS Innovate UK project. Synchronised operation requires that the behaviour
of the vehicles is closely coupled to permit communication via Sonardyne’s BlueComm system; Supervised operation requires the vehicles to be in range of
Sonardyne’s USBL/AvTrak acoustic system; Unsupervised operation implies the vehicles are out of range of communication and are operating independently
from each other; Surface operation allows the vehicles to communicate either directly via Wi-Fi or indirectly via Iridium.
ALR does not have an accurate inertial navigation system
(INS) and experiences significant position drift, requiring the
vehicle to periodically surface to obtain a GPS fix. With the
aim of greatly increasing the positional accuracy of the ALR,
we are developing a co-operative mission format in which
the C-Enduro provides ALR with position updates during
the mission using a USBL system, removing the need for
the ALR to surface [10]. The ALR may also send scientific
and engineering data to C-Enduro using an acoustic modem,
while the C-Enduro may send the ALR new commands (either
autonomously or from a remote operator) mid-mission.
Facilitating interaction between the two vehicles inevitably
requires more flexible and dynamic behaviours than traditional
AUV operations with a single vehicle. For example, if two
vehicles are to successfully rendezvous to transmit data, tem-
poral and spatial constraints need to be introduced to both
vehicle plans, enabling data transmission whilst preventing
collisions. The risks and benefits associated with multi-vehicle
interaction are expected to vary throughout the deployment.
While both vehicles may interact closely during some tasks,
enabling regular navigation updates and data transfer, there
may be times in which independent operation is necessary, for
example due to weather conditions or a need to collect data
in different locations. An overview of the operating modes
considered within the ASSS project is given in Figure 3.
During independent operation, the navigation error of the ALR
will experience unbounded growth, increasing the uncertainty
associated with successfully re-establishing contact with the
C-Enduro. Consequently, the risk to both the vehicles and the
success of the mission is increased.
III. KEY RISK AND RELIABILITY CONSIDERATIONS
When first approaching the task of risk and reliability man-
agement for a system, a preliminary study of the system design
specification is needed to highlight elements of the system
that may compromise its ideal function. These elements are
referred to as the critical items list. A set of safety/reliability
functions will be assigned to each of these elements to ensure
that the risk is at an acceptable level. For example, two critical
items could be defined for C-Enduro and the ALR as follows:
CI1: C-Enduro battery pack voltage
CI2: ALR ability to surface
A description of CI1 would be that ‘it is necessary to avoid a
drop in the battery voltage of C-Enduro’, and for CI2 would be
‘to ensure that the ALR always surfaces following a dive’. The
safety function for CI1 may encompass human-based monitor-
ing of battery voltage and a set of actions triggered manually,
or software-based monitoring and recording of voltage and a
set of automated actions. For the CI2, the safety function may
be to automatically drop the ALR’s abort weight, causing the
vehicle to float to the surface. Any further changes in the
system will need to be checked against the critical items list
before being accepted. For marine vehicles, this list increases
with the level of autonomy of the vehicle, and with the number
of interacting vehicles. To decide on the safety/reliability
functions to implement to ensure an acceptable risk level, and
to enable reliability analysis, a number of elements need to
be considered. These are discussed in the remainder of this
section.
A. Predictive analysis methods
When planning a mission, we need methods for perform-
ing qualitative/quantitative reliability analyses to estimate the
probability of undesirable events. The most widely used
methods are Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Event Tree Analysis
(ETA), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) [11],
or a predictive survival plot that combines data with expert
judgement. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) is
a recommended approach within the marine and unmanned
submersible industry [12], [13] for identifying the effect of
component-level failures on the successful operation of a
system. To perform FMEA, a team of engineers consider the
components of the system and determine the causality between
component-level faults and system-level failures. In many
implementations of FMEA, a risk score is determined using
a measure of the severity of a failure and the likelihood of a
failure occurring. This score is typically determined informally
from expert knowledge and any available fault data - e.g. mean
time between failures (MTBF).
In a 2009 paper, Brito and Griffiths [4, p. 2] state that ‘in
the absence of objective data, a risk analysis exercise is most
efficiently carried out using expert subjective judgement’. In
a 2010 paper, Brito et al. [14] adopted this methodology to
predict the survival of the Autosub3 AUV under 4 different
environments (Open water, Coastal, Sea ice and Ice shelf)
as a function of distance from the departure point. However,
the authors highlighted the difficulties associated with using
expert judgement, stating that a panel of experts provided
probabilities of a fault leading to vehicle loss that spanned
three orders of magnitude. To address this large variability,
Brito et al. combined the collection of expert opinion with the
identification of optimistic and pessimistic opinions, leaving
the decision of whether to use the optimistic or pessimistic
opinion with the human decision maker.
To overcome the lack of data and the large variability
introduced by expert judgement, typical analysis methods may
be combined with a simulation approach to analyse risk. Bian
et al. [15] implemented a fault tree analysis within a Monte-
Carlo simulation for the analysis of AUVs. The method was
shown to be a good predictor of risk and reliability, enabling
analysis into how the reliability of each subsystem impacts the
reliability of the AUV system as a whole.
Current applications of predictive analysis methods within
AUV science have concentrated on conventional mission for-
mats and thus do not represent the risks associated with
more dynamic behaviours, such as those required to facilitate
interaction between multiple platforms. With a focus on the
wider risks associated with traditional AUV deployments, for
example those encountered prior or during launch, Brito and
Griffiths [16] represent the probabilities of loss or successful
recovery during key stages of a deployment as a Markov chain.
However, as they consider conventional mission formats, the
execution of the mission itself is represented using a single
‘Underway’ state, where the probability of loss is a function
of distance travelled. When considering the dynamic format of
multi-vehicle missions, this is likely to be an overly simplistic
assumption and thus an extension of the approach is required.
B. Data collection procedures
Data collection may form part of a safety function to inform
instant trend analysis, for example to record a number of
generator cycles before applying maintenance. Data collection
is also necessary for verification purposes, i.e. to verify that
the safety function is working correctly, reducing the risk of
faults. Additionally, as stated above, data collection is essential
for quantitative analysis of mission risk, as well as for long-
term ongoing reliability trend analysis to inform subsequent
missions. Therefore, it is necessary to formally define a list of
data collection processes, describing the required data and its
purpose. This may include the need to form an expert panel
to gather opinions and build a predictive survival plot of the
mission.
C. Short and long-term reliability analysis tools and methods
After each mission, provided that the data collection has
been performed properly, a series of analysis tools or meth-
ods should be used to monitor the overall efficiency of the
vehicle. This may also be included as a predictive method for
subsequent missions. The most typical analyses are: root cause
of fault plots, which represent the frequency of fault causes;
sensitivity analyses, which represent the influence of specific
factors on the outcome; and survival plots, which represent
the probability of survival vs abort or loss as a function of
distance or time.
Survival analysis methods are classified into parametric and
non-parametric methods. Among the latter, the most popular
is the Kaplan-Meier estimator, also known as product-limit
estimator. Brito et al. [14] utilised it to estimate the probability
of survival of the Autosub3 AUV, as discussed above. This
survival plot could also be obtained as a function of time or
time/distance ratio, which would likely be the most suitable
approach in the present multi-vehicle scenario. Other non-
parametric methods that have been used in other fields for
survival plots are the Actuarial-Simple and Actuarial-Standard
methods for multiple censored data that are arranged in
intervals, or the use of Confidence-Bounds [17], [18]. Typical
parametric methods used in statistics use a continuous function
as the survival plot of a series of data. Brito et al. [14]
also used a Weibull distribution to calculate the effect of
mitigation, which consisted of monitoring the AUV for a
distance away from the departure point, which happened to
be when most of the losses took place. It was seen that it
improved the AUV survival significantly. Other parametric
statistical models widely used in statistics for survival analysis
are the lognormal, loglogistic and exponential [19], [20].
In their 2004 paper, Podder et al. [21] describe their reli-
ability growth analysis in relation to MBARI’s Dorado AUV.
The authors performed trend analysis to determine whether
the failure rate increases or decreases over time, representing
failures occurring during AUV operations as stochastic point
processes. The trend analysis showed a statistically significant
positive reliability growth trend. However, they report a large
variation between the lower and upper bounds of MTBF for
different types of failure. The largest variation in MTBF,
calculated for the extremely critical class of failures, varied
from 52.4 hours to 997.9 hours. To increase the consistency
in MTBF and reliability estimates, they state that more data
needs to be collected.
Unlike traditional expert judgement, where the experts
assess the risks individually, Brito et al’s [22] behavioural
probabilistic risk assessment approach requires the experts to
discuss and agree the a priori distribution of risks to the vehicle
during an upcoming deployment as a group. Following the
completion of the deployment, the experts meet for a second
time and review the mission performance, updating their prior
estimate using Bayes’ rule to produce an estimate of the a
posteriori probability of risk.
D. Verification methods
For each of the safety/reliability functions implemented for
the critical items, a verification method should be placed to
verify its correct function. They can range from manually
checking some parameters such as temperature or voltage,
to automatic data analysis. The verification methods should
be part of the safety function’s validation test. For example,
Tadjine et al. [23] verified the pedestrian collision avoidance of
cars by scene simulations. Nemet and Bartha [24] used model
checking techniques to formally verify the block diagram
leakage safety function in a nuclear plant.
E. Rules and protocols to adhere to from an organisational
and human factors perspective
Together with the expanded use of AUVs, as technology
becomes increasingly costly, it is necessary to enforce risk
targets through the implementation of organisational manage-
ment procedures. Ideally, these procedures should adhere to
reliability industry standards. Thieme et al. [25] proposed a
risk management framework focusing on human and organi-
sational factors (HOFs), including elements of the ISO 31000.
A general document is followed as guidance for all phases.
It shows an application using Fault Tree Analysis and Event
Tree Analysis. This is a very simplified case compared to our
combined multi-vehicle mission, but the framework can be
used as a good protocol example.
F. Agreed risk level
From a company perspective, the target risk level for each
vehicle/mission needs to be agreed so that safety functions
can be implemented to meet the target and their effectiveness
verified against it.
IV. RISK AND RELIABILITY REPRESENTATIONS
In this paper, we focus on the specific problem of selecting
suitable models and quantitative analysis methods for our
multi-vehicle marine domain. To determine a suitable repre-
sentation to model our multi-vehicle scenario, we first need to
identify the key aspects of the domain that influence mission
and vehicle reliability.
A. Definition of mission success criteria
The majority of AUVs are typically deployed with the pri-
mary purpose of collecting high-quality data. In the previous
section, we identified that current applications of risk and
reliability techniques to AUV science have mostly focussed on
the risk or loss of damage to the vehicle itself, rather than the
risk to the vehicle’s data collection capability or the on-board
data itself. Whilst the safe return of the vehicle is paramount,
it is far from the only factor in quantifying the success of
the mission. To evaluate the effect of the mission plan on
the probability of successfully meeting the data collection
objectives, we need a way to represent data quality.
B. Temporal and spatial representation
A temporal representation is especially important when
considering multi-vehicle robotics domains as the interaction
(or lack-of) between two vehicles has a significant impact on
the likelihood of a failure. For instance, while a component
failure in the navigation system of one vehicle may increase
the probability of a collision with a second vehicle, a collision
is only likely if the two vehicles are in a similar location at
the same time. Conversely, in order to successfully complete a
mission in which multiple vehicles must interact, representing
the spatial and temporal separation of the vehicles is crucial
to establishing the probability of successfully completing the
mission.
C. Representation of operating environment
Marine autonomous vehicles operate in extreme environ-
ments, where the conditions are often harsh and unpredictable.
The majority of existing risk and reliability work for AUV
missions do not explicitly represent the impact of the environ-
mental conditions, instead focussing on the specific mission or
the general reliability case, represented using techniques such
as fault trees. In work by Brito et al. [22] the panel of experts
was asked about a specific mission, implicitly factoring the
environment into the analysis process.
D. Heterogeneous vehicles
Our multi-vehicle marine domain involves multiple vehicles
of different types (AUV and ASV) with different risks and
probabilities of failures. To model multi-vehicle missions, we
need to reconcile and combine different vehicle models in a
meaningful way.
V. REVIEW OF REPRESENTATIONS AND QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS METHODS FROM RELATED FIELDS
In a 2007 paper, Grunske et al. [26] state that traditional
applications of FMEA are labour-intensive and the calculation
of the likelihood of system failures occurring is prone to
errors. To this end, they extend FMEA with probabilistic
model checking techniques, presenting an approach they call
probabilistic FMEA (pFMEA). By including component-level
failure rates and probabilistic analysis, pFMEA calculates the
probability of system level failures, allowing engineers to
formally identify and evaluate whether a failure mode occurs
more frequently than is deemed acceptable in the system
specification. Model checking tools may then be used to
validate the system against the safety specification as well as to
experiment with adjusting the component-level probabilities.
For example, evaluating how the reliability of the system
changes if the failure rate of a given component is reduced.
To use pFMEA, the system must be modelled probabilisti-
cally, e.g. using a continuous time Markov chain (CTMC) or
Markov decision process (MDP) [27]. Grunske et al. represent
their metal press system as a CTMC, which allows them to
specify the mean time to transition between certain states,
incorporating temporal information into the model, e.g. it takes
the plunger six seconds to fall from the top to the bottom of
the press. Grunske et al. state there is a current trend towards
state-based models such as Markov models and Stochastic
Petri-nets, as these provide a better representation of temporal
properties of the system model, such as the order in which
a series of component failures will lead to a system-level
failure/hazard, than traditional fault-trees.
Norman and Parker [28] present an overview of the field of
model checking and quantitative verification. In model check-
ing, the correct behaviour of a system is formally specified
(typically using temporal logic). A mathematical model is
then constructed that captures all possible executions of the
system. This is then analysed to verify correctness properties
are satisfied. Norman and Parker state that with the rise of
a need for reliable systems operating in unpredictable and
unreliable environments, non-functional or quantitative aspects
of correctness have become increasingly important. By also
modelling the probability and timings of events occurring,
model checking may be extended into quantitative verification.
This allows questions such as ‘is the probability of the robot
finishing task a without depleting its battery greater than
0.95?’ to be evaluated.
Whilst focussing on plan generation, Feng et al. [29]
represent their multi-agent surveillance domain as both an
MDP and a two-player stochastic game. The domain requires
interaction between the two agents — a UAV flies between
waypoints autonomously, while a human operator controls the
capture of images at waypoints. The UAV may only continue
to the next waypoint once the human operator is satisfied with
the quality of the images. When modelling the domain as an
MDP, Feng et al. model the operator and the UAV separately.
However, some actions are common to both models which
allows the computation of the product of the two MDPs,
representing the interaction between the two agents. Feng et
al. pay particular attention to the modelling of human factors
in the operator model, namely operator workload and fatigue,
and the effect these have on expected mission completion time
and the expected number of visits to high-risk areas. By instead
modelling the problem as a stochastic game, the choices made
by the operator are much less constrained and do not require
the probability distribution of the operators choices to be fully
defined, as in the MDP model. The game model represents the
chance that a human operator would make fully adversarial
choices (e.g. sending the UAV around an infinite loop of
waypoints), despite this being highly unlikely in reality. To
address this, Feng et al. introduce a probability that the human
operator instead allows the UAV to make the choice. This
delegation probability is easier to define as it is not mission
specific and can be calculated from past mission logs.
VI. PROPOSED REPRESENTATIONS AND QUANTITATIVE
RISK ANALYSIS METHODS FOR THE MULTI-VEHICLE
DOMAIN
In Section II we presented our motivating problem, that of
an ASV co-operating with an AUV, providing communication
and navigational updates to the AUV when necessary. Follow-
ing our review of the relevant literature and our identification
of the key considerations, we now select a combination of
techniques to form our proposed risk and reliability solution
for our multi-vehicle domain. A multi-vehicle domain in which
two complicated platforms, each comprised of many sub-
systems, interact within the unpredictable and unforgiving en-
vironment of the ocean is very difficult to accurately model in
a single representation. Instead, we consider the representation
and analysis of the risks within the system at varying levels
of abstraction.
A. Sub-system-level representation
We propose that many vehicle sub-systems, such as the
propulsion system, where the possible failure modes are
relatively constrained and the specification formalised and
quantified, may be modelled and evaluated using conven-
tional and widely-used techniques such as FMEA or fault-
tree analysis. As these systems are typically constructed from
off-the-shelf components, data such as mean time between
failures may be used to inform component-level failure rates.
When combined with model-checking techniques, such as in
Grunske et al’s pFMEA approach [26], the sub-system may
also be validated against the specification. pFMEA requires
the system to be modelled using a probabilistic representation,
such as a CTMC. By utilising a probabilistic representation,
the model may be used to investigate the impact of a particular
component, e.g. a bearing, on the reliability of the whole
sub-system, e.g. the propulsion system. The identification
of critical components can then be used to inform further
development, maintenance scheduling and the implementation
of suitable safety functions.
B. Vehicle-level representation
In order to understand the possible cause of faults and
failures, it will be necessary to perform vehicle specific
analysis to represent the causality and determine the path
of subsystems that may have been involved. A widely-used
method is Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) or Event Tree Analysis
(ETA), as mentioned earlier. However, it is necessary to have
appropriate documentation to understand how the vehicle’s
subsystems interact to perform each of the vehicle’s functions.
Therefore, systems block diagrams should be provided as a
support documentation to inform FTA or ETA, describing the
subsystems that are in series or parallel. Performing FTA for
all vehicles to infer causality and estimate probabilities for
each potential failure scenario is highly time consuming. A
random sampling simulation approach such as Monte Carlo
simulation could also be used to estimate the probability
density functions of failure within less critical sub-systems.
In fact, this could be performed as a preliminary analysis to
understand the sub-systems that have the most significant influ-
ence on the mission outcome. The balance between accuracy,
variability and computational time will drive the ratio of FTAs
to simulations performed. The probability density functions
could also be approximated more accurately by the combined
use of data and expert judgement.
C. Multi-vehicle, mission-level representation
In Section IV, we identified the need for representing
probabilities as well as temporal and spatial properties within
the mission-level model. From our literature review, Markov
chains and MDPs are popular representations for analysing
probabilities. As in the work by Brito and Griffiths [16],
Markov chains have been used as effective representation for
simple AUV deployments, as well as more widely as rep-
resentations for risk analysis [30]–[32]. However, as mission
formats become more dynamic, with vehicle behaviour depen-
dent on interaction between multiple platforms, the problem
may be better represented as an MDP, as used by Feng et
al. [29]. An MDP would allow the choice of action to take
at a given state to be modelled, e.g. representing that C-
Enduro may send the ALR new commands mid-mission, or
that C-Enduro may need to enter a search-behaviour if initial
attempts at establishing communication with ALR fail. Feng
et al model the two agents in their problem as separate MDPs,
computing the product MDP for the combined system using
actions common to both agents. Such a representation would
allow us to consider heterogeneous fleets, where different
vehicle types may perform different actions, provided multi-
vehicle interactions are defined using common actions. The
same MDP representation may be used to model single-vehicle
deployments or combined to form product MDPs for multi-
vehicle missions. The impact of states and actions on data
quality may also be represented using probability distributions.
The transition probabilities within the MDP may be defined
using techniques such as expert judgement or as a function
of the results of sub-system and vehicle-level analysis. In an
MDP, the transition function, which describes the probability
of transitioning to a state q having performed action a1 in state
p, must be defined for all combinations of states and actions
[27]. Given the complexity of our multi-vehicle domain and
the infeasible number of possible vehicle and environmental
states, it is important to constrain an MDP representation
to the most critical factors influencing mission success. By
only representing a sub-set of the multi-vehicle system within
our model, we are unlikely to be able to calculate accurate
estimates of the true probability of mission success. However,
we would be able to compare the risk vs reward of one
mission plan or strategy against another. For example, in one
strategy our ASV and AUV might interact throughout the
mission, constraining the magnitude of ALR’s position error
and improving the quality of the data. However, this may also
increase the risk of collisions. Conversely, a second strategy
might schedule regular rendezvous points. The ALR’s position
error will grow whilst not receiving navigational updates from
C-Enduro, but the probability of collision is reduced. Such a
model would allow us to compare these strategies, evaluating
the risk-reward tradeoff. Whilst only modelling a subset of
the full multi-vehicle system will reduce the accuracy of the
estimates of the true probability of mission success, it is worth
noting that expert judgement is still prone to large variation.
Combining an MDP model of the key factors influencing
mission success with expert judgement where data is sparse
may be an effective solution.
A common safety function for AUVs are mission-stage
timeouts, e.g. if the vehicle does not reach the target waypoint
within a given time, a contingency behaviour (such as surfac-
ing) will be triggered. Equally, if the vehicle does not complete
the mission and surface within an expected time, a drop weight
may be released to cause the vehicle to float to the surface.
These timeouts define definite points in the mission where
the behaviour of the vehicle will change. As the behaviour
changes, so to will the distribution of risks, e.g. on dropping
an abort weight, the vehicle has a reduced chance of failing
to surface; however, upon floating to the surface the vehicle
is unable to fully manoeuvre and thus cannot continue with
the mission. As these timeouts occur at defined points in the
mission, it may be sufficient to discretise the representation of
time within the model. However, if we also wished to represent
the probability of an abort condition being triggered at any
point in the plan as a result of a vehicle fault, we may need
to consider using a continuous-time Markov chain.
D. Wider considerations
Whilst we have focussed on methods and representations
for performing quantitative and qualitative analysis for risk
estimation within our specific multi-vehicle scenario, in order
for this work to be effective on an industrial scale we will
also need to address the wider aspects of the problem as
defined in Section III. The most fundamental requirement is to
invest in suitable procedures and safety functions to facilitate
the collection of risk and reliability data. We have presented
many methods for quantifying risk that rely on combining
the probabilities of individual faults to calculate the resulting
probability of mission success, vehicle loss etc. However, these
resultant probabilities are only as good as the model and
the individual probabilities which form the input of the risk
calculation. As we currently do not have sufficient data to
calculate accurate probabilities, expert judgement is necessary.
In order to improve our probability estimates, we must seek
to facilitate the collection of the required risk and reliability
data. Whilst all vehicle data is logged, the poor situational
awareness, typical of most marine autonomous vehicles, means
that the wider context of the mission is often under-recorded.
For example, during a mission, a surface vehicle may record
poor energy gains from its solar panels — this could be a
result of a fault within the solar panels, or it could be that
the weather was cloudy and thus not conducive to effective
charging. It is therefore essential that procedures are in place
to ensure the mission meta-data, e.g. environmental/weather
conditions, what happened to the vehicle prior to and during
launch, as well as human factors such as who was involved,
what were the shift patterns, are adequately recorded. It is
equally important that safety functions are implemented to
ensure critical engineering data is collected - e.g. if battery
temperature is identified on the critical list, it is essential that
the vehicle logs this data with sufficient frequency.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have presented a review of existing risk and
reliability techniques, both applied to the field of marine auton-
omy and from other related disciplines. We have highlighted
the key risk and reliability considerations when designing a
methodology for our multi-vehicle marine domain, focussing
on the task of selecting appropriate representations and quan-
titative analysis methods in this paper. As it is very difficult
to accurately represent all aspects of a complicated multi-
vehicle system operating in an unpredictable environment in a
single model, we instead proposed representing and analysing
the risks to different components of the multi-vehicle system
at varying levels of abstraction. As conventional techniques
such as FMEA have been widely applied to systems where
the failure modes are relatively constrained, we propose the
use of an FMEA-based approach, such as Grunske et al’s
[26] pFMEA, for vehicle sub-system level risk and analysis.
The probabilities of sub-system failure modes may then be
combined with knowledge of the system design (e.g. a system
block diagram) to determine the effect of individual failures
on the likelihood of vehicle-level failure modes by using a
method such as Fault Tree Analysis. At the multi-vehicle
mission level, we propose modelling each vehicle as an MDP,
representing the interaction between the vehicles by computing
the product MDP in the manner of Feng et al. [29]. The
transition probabilities within the MDP may then be defined
using the results of the sub-system and vehicle-level analysis
combined with expert judgement where there is insufficient
data.
We have also highlighted the need to consider the wider
aspects of the risk and reliability problem, including the
need for safety functions and verification methods, as well
as adequate rules and protocols. Protocols relating to the
collection of risk and reliability data are especially crucial.
Without sufficient data, we have to rely on expert judgement
which is labour intensive and prone to large variability. While
expert judgement should be used in the absence of data, to
improve the accuracy of predictive analysis methods and verify
the efficacy of safety functions, it is essential that protocols
are implemented to ensure the collection of vehicle risk and
reliability data in the future.
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